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Making the Loyalist Bargain: Surrender, Amnesty and
Impunity in Kenya’s Decolonization, 1952–63
David M. Anderson
ABSTRACT
In ﬁghting Mau Mau rebels in Kenya between 1952 and 1956, the
British armed and deployed an African militia, known as the Kikuyu
Home Guard. This article considers the role played by these allies in
the counter-insurgency war, looking speciﬁcally at amnesty and
surrenders. The British held secret talks with Mau Mau leaders in
1954, and again in 1955, to organize rebel surrenders. The politics of
surrenders split the Mau Mau movement, and also raised massive
opposition amongst white settlers. Amnesty and impunity were
inducements to Mau Mau surrenders, but were offered primarily to
prevent disaffection and desertion among loyalist Kikuyu African
militia allies who feared prosecution for abuses and atrocities
carried out during counter-insurgency operations. Loyalist Africans
also feared the consequences of rebels returning to their home
communities. Amnesty and promises of impunity thus shaped the
character of Kenya’s counter-insurgency campaign and the
decolonization that followed. This was determined by the need for
the British to secure the continued support of African allies up to
Kenya’s independence in 1963, and beyond.
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Introduction
In all the wars of decolonization fought across Africa and Asia from the 1940s until the
1970s, European colonial powers deployed local forces to battle against armed nationalist
groups. These local allied combatants, variously known as auxiliaries, militias or loyalists
when drawn together in irregular forces, or sometimes more formally recruited to swell
the ranks of police or military reserves, often became a critically important component of
colonial counter-insurgencies.1 Whether providing local knowledge, adding greatly to the
intelligence capacity of the military campaign, inﬁltrating the enemy in support of ‘black
operations’, or driving a wedge through the supposed solidarities of nationalist move-
ments, allied forces of this kind had many uses. But while their utility in the war is clear
enough, their status in the making of a peace that would allow the strategic European
withdrawal that decolonization demanded presented numerous political hurdles. How
should such imperial allies be treated as empire came to its end? Loyal militias were her-
oes of the colonial state, while nationalists usually saw such people as collaborators, com-
pradors or simple traitors. What future did such groups have after colonialism?
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Argument
This article considers the role of one such group, the Kikuyu Home Guard, a so-called ‘loy-
alist’ militia, who fought alongside the British against Mau Mau rebels in colonial Kenya in
the 1950s. At Kenya’s independence in 1963, following the suppression of the rebellion, it
was the loyalists who claimed the political victory and ﬁlled the ranks of the new African
government.2 In a critical move that was intended ﬁrst to ensure victory in the counter-
insurgency war, the British made a bargain with their African loyalist allies that involved
agreement over the safe surrender of Mau Mau ﬁghters, and that gave amnesty and
impunity from prosecution for both rebels and loyalist militia. It was the pushing through
of this loyalist bargain that allowed Kenya to achieve its independence much earlier than
the British had intended after their military defeat of the Mau Mau forces at the end of
1956.
The argument put forward here is that surrenders, amnesty, and impunity were the key
elements of the political settlement in Kenya, although they have been controversial
topics for all of those writing histories of the Mau Mau rebellion and the British counter-
insurgency that suppressed it. The question of surrenders has long perplexed Kenya’s
nationalist historians, some of whom have been inclined only to present surrenders’ as
acts of betrayal against the movement.3 But as other nationalist historians acknowledge,
this ignores the evidence to be found in the writings of the forest ﬁghters themselves,4
and the documentary evidence to be found in the colonial archives,5 both of which indi-
cate that senior Mau Mau leaders, including Dedan Kimathi,6 opened negotiations with
the British to discuss surrender terms. For Kenya’s nationalist historians, there are uncom-
fortable truths to be wrestled with in this history, while for other historians the surrenders
are viewed simply as a logical element in colonial strategy.7 Huw Bennett, writing of the
role of the British army in the Kenya counter-insurgency, has emphasized the importance
of surrenders as part of the military campaign devised by General Erskine on taking over
command in June 1953.8 Erskine saw the offer of surrenders both as a means to under-
mine Mau Mau solidarity by ‘peeling off’ reluctant recruits or those who had lost the
enthusiasm to endure the hardships of the forests, and as a propaganda tool in which the
British military might present themselves as magnanimous and fair to their African ene-
mies9 and so counter-act the highly racial presentation of the conﬂict by Kenya’s white
settlers.10 But the surrender offers also had a strong political aspect that reﬂected far
more than the military conduct of the counter-insurgency campaign. Daniel Branch, writ-
ing about the role of African ‘loyalists’ amongst the Kikuyu of central Kenya, has recog-
nized the delicate political predicament faced by loyalist leaders as the rebellion drew to a
close, highlighting their need both to protect self-interest and to secure community soli-
darity in order to sustain a fragile peace.11 His point will be developed, to argue that it
was calculations about loyalty, and about the need to build a sustainable peace that
secured loyalist domination, that ﬁnally shaped the character of surrenders, amnesty, and
the granting of impunity.
This article goes further, then, beyond the military strategies of Bennett or the
social and economic imperatives highlighted by Branch, to consider the sharp politics
of the loyalist bargain, looking at the critical moments in which compromise was
forced. The opening section describes the militarization of the countryside that
emerged as a consequence of the arming and enlargement of the Kikuyu Home
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Guard. This generated antagonisms in the villages of Central Province, with a rising
tide of vengeance, retribution and atrocity that by the end of 1954 threatened to
overwhelm the rule of law as the Kikuyu Home Guard exploited their position of
authority to intimidate, coerce and punish rebel sympathizers. The second part of
this article then recounts the history of the three surrender offers made to the Mau
Mau rebels between August 1953 and July 1955, demonstrating how these negotia-
tions worked to threaten loyalist security just as they sought to undermine rebel soli-
darity. While amnesty and impunity could be presented as a signiﬁcant compromise
to entice rebel surrenders, they ultimately became mechanisms elaborated and
extended to protect loyalists from prosecutions, thus allowing them to maintain their
political and economic status into the future. This loyalist bargain, giving amnesty
and impunity to those who fought under the British ﬂag, was forged to ensure that
the war could be won but it also set the terms upon which the peace would be
made.
Militarizing the countryside
Mau Mau’s emergence after 1945 as a radical, and ultimately violent anti-colonial rising,
has now been well documented.12 Like all other revolutionary movements, its ﬁrst effect
was to divide, and not unite, the communities amongst whom it principally sought to
recruit. Opposition to Mau Mau was apparent amongst the Kikuyu communities of Kenya’s
Central Province long before the British declaration of a State of Emergency on 20 October
1952.13 Over the increasingly bloody months of 1951 and 1952, the ‘stumps’14 who put
themselves in Mau Mau’s way were ground down and eliminated by the movement’s
enforcers and assassins – the victims of this violence were the Tribal Policemen, headmen,
locational councillors, prominent church leaders, and indeed anyone else who threatened
to expose the movement’s oathing of adherents and its collections of money across the
ridges and valleys of central Kenya. While Mau Mau’s agenda was quietly debated and
contested everywhere, public opposition to the movement was being hardened in the
kiln of violence.
The ﬁrst public manifestation of Kikuyu ‘loyalism’ in the face of the 1950s insurrection
came in August 1952, with a large meeting called in Kiambu of the self-styled ‘Army of
God’. By this time, prominent church elders, and also the teachers at church schools, had
been targeted by Mau Mau oath administrators, and many among the strongest Kikuyu
Christian communities were already feeling threatened by the movement. Leading African
Protestant clergy, assisted by some Catholics, organized the Kiambu meeting to show
public solidarity against this rising tide of Mau Mau intimidation and violence. Over the
following months, church-based groups began to organize local vigilantes to protect their
property and their leading personnel from attack. The state moved in to support this
development once colonial ofﬁcers came to realize that a locally-recruited militia, now
styled as the ‘Home Guard’, might have practical utility.15 By the end of January 1953, only
7,600 Kikuyu men had been recruited into the Kikuyu Home Guard,16 and there still
remained considerable doubt as to how this force should be armed, directed, and con-
trolled. This uncertainty was removed in March 1953, in the wake of the Lari massacre.17
The attack by Mau Mau upon loyalist homesteads in the Kiambu settlement of Lari was by
no means the ﬁrst to target loyalists, but its scale and brutally chilling character sent a
50 D. M. ANDERSON
shiver of fear through those communities who had sought to avoid the growing contesta-
tion of Mau Mau’s presence. Before Lari, many communities had resisted ‘taking sides’:
after Lari, the dangers of remaining without clear afﬁliation were obvious, and people
ﬂooded into the loyalist fold.
Why did people afﬁliate with loyalism? As early as 1971, only eight years following Ken-
ya’s independence, Bethwell Alan Ogot was the ﬁrst of Kenya’s historians to probe the
question of what deﬁned loyalism in these difﬁcult years of insurrection.18 Ogot identiﬁed
several types of loyalist, each with differing motivation, but he did not think that any of
them were genuine supporters of British colonialism. And only a relatively small portion of
those termed Loyalist were thought by Ogot to ﬁt Mau Mau’s slur that they were all ‘self-
seeking scoundrels’, taking advantage of the struggle for personal preferment or eco-
nomic gain. The majority of those who signed up for the loyalist ticket, he argued, were
victims of circumstance, drawn into ‘loyalty’ by the trajectory of pre-Mau Mau patron-cli-
ent politics, or provoked by simple fear; while others merely responded to the pressures
put upon them by the state, and were not, in their hearts, opposed to the aims of national-
ism. Finally, Ogot observed that just as Mau Mau itself changed over time, so did the
response to it. Not all Mau Mau’s deeds had been justiﬁed, and some of their excesses –
notably the Lari atrocity - had provoked others into opposition. Loyalist vengeance was
retaliatory and often severe, and its violence hardened them against the rebels over the
bitter months that followed the Lari attack of March 1953. Loyalism, then, was not an ide-
ology, but a predicament, and determined though its adherents might be, they were far
from fully committed to the British cause.19
After Lari, the colonial state moved rapidly to enlarge the loyalist horde, and to
strengthen and arm its militia. This became an important element in the security plan for
the war against Mau Mau in Central Province. By May 1953, the ﬁve battalions of the King’s
African Riﬂes deployed in Kenya had been augmented by three battalions of British
troops, amounting to a force of 4,500 trained soldiers under General Erskine’s command.
In addition, the Chief-of-Staff had at his disposal an armoured car squadron and an artil-
lery battery, and a much larger force of reservists and irregulars, of which the Kikuyu
Home Guard was the largest element, along with the various branches of the colonial
police service.20 From the day of his arrival, Erskine recognized that the reservists, irregu-
lars, and police units of this kind, could not be managed or disciplined in the same man-
ner as fully-trained military units, and so he worked out a plan that would separate
military from civilian forces as speedily as possible. At the heart of this plan was the idea
that an enlarged military force could conﬁne Mau Mau activity to the forest zones, hand-
ing over control of the towns and populated rural countryside to the police and the civil
administration and their militias. In essence, Erskine’s soldiers would ﬁght Mau Mau in the
forests, ‘free ﬁre’ zones in which the Army could legitimately shoot at any persons they
found,21 while the colonial administration and police would be left to tackle the so-called
Passive Wing in the countryside.
This neat division of responsibility had many attractions from a military perspective, but
its unintended consequence would be the militarization of the countryside by armed civil-
ian forces as they struggled to maintain order in circumstances where rebel activities were
continuing and could not be easily curtailed. This was a problem Erskine was content to
leave to others to resolve.22 It would take him eight months to reach the point where the
ﬁrst areas could be handed over to civilian control: on 12 February 1954, the army handed
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over Thika and Fort Hall districts to the civil administration, with the Home Guard and
police becoming directly responsible for day-to-day security. Following the success of
Operation Anvil in clearing Mau Mau cells out of Nairobi in May 1954, the civil administra-
tion and the police rapidly assumed responsibility for security operations in other Kikuyu
districts, though it would not be until late in 1956 that the military was able to completely
realize Erskine’s plan to disengage from civilian areas.23 Meanwhile, Operation Overdraft,
from 11-15 April 1954, saw Kikuyu Home Guard units deployed for the ﬁrst time in opera-
tional roles that had previously been conducted by the military, and from that date for-
ward they increasingly acted in a military fashion, despite their lack of training and their
renowned ill-discipline.24 By June 1954, armed Kikuyu loyalists dominated the security
arrangements throughout the Central Province.
The scale of armed control of civilian areas that this implied was immense.25 One year
after the Lari massacre, in March 1954, the Kikuyu Home Guard reached its peak number
of 25,600 recruits, and by then outnumbered the Mau Mau ﬁghters in the forests. Initially
armed with spears, machetes, and bows, the vast majority of all Home Guard recruits
were issued with riﬂes by December 1953.26 More than 200 Home Guard posts were con-
structed in the Central Province by December 1954, these fortiﬁed garrisons dominating
the rural landscape.27 Home Guard posts were nothing less than military camps, staffed
by an armed civilian militia, under the loose supervision of African headmen and Euro-
pean District Ofﬁcers. Most Home Guard posts were used as interrogation centres and as
gaols, where suspects might be held in secure custody. In areas of the countryside where
Mau Mau held sway, and where loyalists might fall prey to attack in the dead of night, mili-
tiamen and their families crowded into the post as darkness fell. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, Home Guard posts themselves became primary targets for attack by Mau Mau gangs
during 1953 and 1954.
Other security forces augmented the Home Guard militia in the Kikuyu areas. The
Kenya Police was greatly expanded during the early phase of the Emergency, contributing
further to this militarization of the countryside. Increasing from 7,135 personnel in Octo-
ber 1952 to 11,166 overall by the end of 1953, the number of European ofﬁcers in the
Kenya Police also tripled in this period. Where there had been only four police stations in
the Kikuyu Reserves in October 1952, by the start of 1954, there were over 70.28 The Police
Reserve also swelled from a pre-Emergency establishment of 2,982 to 8,547 by December
1953, and the Tribal Police, who operated under the authority of the district administra-
tion and the African chiefs, almost doubled in size, climbing to 2,195 men. An additional
2,009 African Special Police were recruited for guard duties under the supervision of Police
Reservists.29 All of these other arms of state security intermingled with the Home Guard,
but only the Home Guard was an exclusively Kikuyu force, the others being dominated by
other Africans.
District Ofﬁcers from the Kenya Regiment held sway over the Kikuyu Home Guard,
and had authority over the Chiefs and Headmen who ran the Tribal Police. Recruited
from among the colony’s European population, the Kenya Regiment had been recon-
stituted in 1949 to allow white settlers to continue to receive military training without
the awkward necessity of conscription.30 In Kenya’s Emergency, the Regiment found
an entirely new and unanticipated role: ofﬁcers spoke local languages and so were
deployed almost exclusively in intelligence duties and in command of the Kikuyu
Home Guard.31 These raw and inexperienced young men, mostly in their early 20s,
52 D. M. ANDERSON
found themselves by 1953 running a large militarized administration in Central Prov-
ince, whose primary concern was security and intelligence-gathering. To make this
administration work, they relied upon the Kikuyu loyalists: both had strong vested
interest in the struggle that confronted them.
From March 1953 until the end of 1954, the Kikuyu Home Guard led the assault
upon Mau Mau and their Passive Wing supporters throughout Central Province.
Described in this period by one senior ofﬁcial as ‘an undisciplined rabble’, the Home
Guard now gave up the reluctance they had shown in the earlier phase of the war to
engage in violence and instead moved against those they felt to be a threat.32 As vio-
lence escalated, those who had tried to remain neutral were forced to take sides. This
process, termed by Kalyvas as ‘the privatisation of politics,’ saw the violence become
both more intense and more intimate, as Kikuyu Home Guard used the authority of
their status to ‘settle personal scores.’33 Much of this violence was local, committed by
and against persons who knew one another. And this knowledge, inevitably, fuelled
many acts of vengeance. As Branch acknowledges, ‘The provincial administration used
the Home Guard to sate a widely held European desire for revenge for Mau Mau atroc-
ities.’34 Indiscipline, excess, and abuse became the norm over these months, as the
provincial administration allowed the Home Guard to take the ﬁght to the enemy, the
very structure of the command of the militia units making allowance for ‘local cus-
toms’ and rejecting too strong a degree of centralized control. Home Guard became
responsible for the ‘screening’ of Kikuyu suspected of Mau Mau sympathy, these inter-
rogations opening the way to considerable abuse. Those suspected of association with
the rebels could be committed to periods of detention on the basis of a Home Guard
testimony, and without reference to any other kind of evidence. The violence of the
screening teams commonly involved the beating of suspects, including the use of a
variety of physical tortures. Information on this came to light at the time through a
number of legal cases brought against ‘screeners,’ and further documentary evidence
has since been revealed.35 Government directives on the operation of the Kikuyu
Home Guard made it clear that their strength lay in their close engagement with the
struggle, and that an element of excess was accordingly to be expected.36 Home
Guard violence was not ‘mistaken’, then: rather, it was a functional element of the role
they were assigned.
In the best cases, as in many parts of southern Kiambu, the loyalist militia held the ring
over an uneasy peace with local rebel sympathizers: in the worst cases, as at Ruthagathi in
Nyeri, Kikuyu Home Guard posts by 1954 became centres of extortion and terror over the
local population.37 Efforts to build a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the Kikuyu areas fell
foul of the tit-for-tat character of the struggle between the rebels and Home Guard that
had become entrenched by 1954. Having created a militia to divide the Kikuyu, the British
could not then control it. Yet, despite the growing concerns that had already surfaced
about violence and abuses in the conduct of the Home Guard, the visit of Lyttleton’s par-
liamentary delegation to Nairobi in January 1954 resulted in the recommendation that
the Kikuyu Home Guard be expanded and their role further enlarged.38 As 1954 wore on,
the loyalists took a steely grip on the Kikuyu countryside of Central Province, increasingly
left by their British paymasters to do whatever was necessary to maintain order and sup-
press Mau Mau’s Passive Wing.
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Surrenders and amnesty
Between June 1953 and July 1956, the British operated three different surrender schemes
for Mau Mau forest ﬁghters. While the military aspects of these schemes are well under-
stood,39 the political ramiﬁcations of surrenders have been largely ignored.40 Terrorist sur-
renders were deeply controversial amongst both Kenya’s white settler population, and
amongst the Kikuyu loyalist community. The former wanted no concessions to be offered
to the rebels, and saw anything short of complete military victory as an admission of Brit-
ish capitulation. The latter had more prosaic fears, anxious lest surrendered rebels might
ﬁnd their way back to their home districts and villages, where their return might fuel fur-
ther confrontation and violence. Because of this vexed politics, British ofﬁcials did their
best to keep information about the surrender deals away from public scrutiny – a task in
which they consummately failed, as we shall see, but that only served to heighten public
anxiety and increase rumours about the surrenders and their possible consequences.
These concerns built up over the course of the Emergency, as the brief summary that fol-
lows of each of the three schemes illustrates.
Surrender offer 1: Green branch, July to December 1953
The use of surrenders as a tactic to destabilize the Mau Mau forest gangs was ﬁrst advo-
cated with the arrival of General George Erskine as commander-in-chief of the British
forces in June 1953, some nine months into the Emergency. Erskine was aware of the
need to view the rebellion in political terms, and not to treat it simply as a military
problem. ‘Unless we deal with the fundamental causes that allowed Mau Mau to grow
up and prosper,’ Erskine wrote in August 1953, ‘we shall get further trouble in a differ-
ent form.’41 Surrenders were discussed during the ﬁrst meeting of the Kenya Intelli-
gence Committee held following Erskine’s arrival in Nairobi. Two points were
advanced: ﬁrst, that surrenders had been a useful tactic in the Malayan counter-insur-
gency; and, that the lack of a strong ideological element among the forest gangs in
Kenya might lead to a larger number of surrenders than had occurred amongst
Malaya’s communists.42 Only 29 incidents of voluntary surrender had been recorded
by August 1953,43 but the lack of clear operational directive regarding how non-com-
bat surrenders should be handled,44 and the mayhem of the campaign in the ﬁrst ﬁve
months of 1953 when there were widespread rumours of the mistreatment of captives
and even of prisoners being summarily shot,45 would obviously have discouraged Mau
Mau ﬁghters from giving themselves up. Erskine recognized that greater discipline
from the security forces, and clearer regulations governing surrenders would be nec-
essary. But there were other political sensitivities to be guarded against: neither Afri-
can loyalist militias nor the white settlers were likely to be sympathetic to rebel
surrenders. The Intelligence Committee therefore declared that surrenders were to ‘be
treated as secret’, and ‘discussed with the utmost discretion and aired as little as pos-
sible in Committee minutes.’46
This was the ﬁrst step to what would become known as the Green Branch surrender
offer47 - so named because rebels were instructed to declare their surrender by carrying a
green branch. Instructions issued to military commanders and administrative ofﬁcers in
July 1953 stressed that surrender terms should be made known to the Mau Mau gangs,
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but not widely publicized otherwise. ‘It will obviously be necessary to brief your Kikuyu
Guard Units… to a certain extent,’ instructed Hinde, Erskine’s deputy, ‘But,’ he continued:
it is surrenders to Government Ofﬁcers, of the Army, Police or Administration, that should be
encourage whenever possible.… Kikuyu Guards should be told to hand on surrendered terro-
rists and not deal with them themselves, and they should not be told more than is necessary
about the surrender policy, in order that they should not become discouraged or disaffected
by gaining the impression that surrendered terrorists are beingtreated too leniently.48
British anxiety about the adverse reaction of the Kikuyu Home Guard to the surrenders
was thus apparent from the outset, and was just as signiﬁcant as their concerns about
white settler opposition. Incentives would be needed to encourage the rebels to give up,
so it was decided that voluntary surrenders would not be prosecuted for Emergency capi-
tal offences other than murder, while those who had committed no offence at all would
not face any prosecution.49 The risks involved in this were clear enough, and Baring, in
particular, was especially nervous of white settler opinion. The governor’s reluctance ini-
tially forced Erskine to stay his hand on full implementation of the offer, but, having
worked hard to gain the support of London, Erskine seized upon the opportunity provided
by two letters that came to the government in July 1953 from rebel leader Dedan Kimathi.
These communications were judged by Special Branch to be authentic, and in a hand
they thought they recognized as his own (although it was that of his secretary, Karari
Njama). In the letters, Kimathi offered the government a truce, commencing on 1 August
1953. While it was unclear how the rebel leader thought negotiations might develop, the
British assumed that he was seeking an amnesty of some kind.50
Erskine urged Baring to grasp the nettle by issuing the surrender offer. The decision to
initiate the full surrender campaign was reached on 20 August 1953 in the Intelligence
Committee. Despite the steps taken to ensure secrecy, within hours rumours were
swirling around Nairobi about Kimathi’s letters and government ‘capitulation.’ Settler
opinion was rapidly stoked up against what was seen as ‘weakness’,51 and Baring was
forced to write a hasty note to London to explain why things had been so badly han-
dled.52 By the time that Kikuyu Home Guard units throughout Central Province were
briefed, on the morning of Sunday 23 August, the colony was already awash with talk
of the surrender terms.53
Few rebels took up the surrender offer in the ﬁrst three weeks, but a further communi-
cation arrived from Kimathi, requesting face-to-face negotiations. The government made
no response to this suggestion. The reason for this is not entirely clear, but it seems likely
that Baring was reluctant to authorize negotiations for fear of further political difﬁculties
with the settlers.54 In the weeks that followed, surrenders continued to trickle in, as criti-
cism of the scheme mounted. White settlers and African loyalists made their opposition
known, and even senior administrative ofﬁcers in Central Province were openly critical,
suggesting that it implied weakness on the government’s part and that a ﬁrmer military
line should be taken instead.55 These ofﬁcers worried about the reaction of Kikuyu loyal-
ists, who would expect prosecutions and might fear the return of any terrorist to the com-
munity. Reassurances were given about prosecutions, but there was a clear apprehension
that administrative opposition to the surrender plan might adversely affect its implemen-
tation. Strict instructions were therefore given to keep surrendered terrorists separately at
police interrogation centres, and not to hand them into the custody of Kikuyu loyalists or
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European administration ofﬁcers, neither of whom could be completely trusted.56 In a fur-
ther step, taken in October 1953, Baring instructed that all surrendered terrorists would
be automatically placed under formal Detention Orders – removing the possibility that
any might be released into the community.57 In the months that followed, Baring contin-
ued to reassure settler leaders that no concessions would be granted to anyone known to
have committed Emergency offences.58
Despite these difﬁcult politics, the intelligence gain to be made from surrendered terro-
rists was put forward as the key justiﬁcation for the policy. It was agreed that interroga-
tions of surrendered prisoners should initially be undertaken in forward positions by the
army and police units who captured them. These ofﬁcers classiﬁed the surrendered terro-
rists as ‘hard core’ or ‘soft core.’ With these labels attached, surrendered rebels were for-
warded to the detention camps, where they would be kept separately from other
prisoners – partly to protect their intelligence value, but also with their personal safety in
mind: it was always understood that harm might come to surrenders.59 Hard-core surren-
ders were ﬁrst sent to Kajiado camp, while a new facility was planned at Athi River to
house up to 250.60 However, intelligence gathered from surrendered rebels revealed that
the majority were ‘soft core’, the preponderance of cases in which the surrenders claimed
to have been abducted or coerced into service in the forests being especially striking61 -
this reinforcing Erskine’s conviction that the gangs might be easily disrupted and possibly
decimated by an effective surrender campaign, but also indicating that surrender held no
appeal to Mau Mau’s ‘hard-core.’
By early February 1954, the Green Branch campaign was ﬂoundering. Consideration
was given to offering substantial rewards for those bringing in a surrendering rebel, and
pleas were made to focus military campaigning on areas where surrender offers and pub-
licity might then be concentrated.62 But while there was only 159 surrenders in the six
months between August 1953 and February 1954,63 by January 1955 a total of 815 surren-
ders had been recorded.64
Surrender offer 2: Operation Wedgwood, February to April 1954
The capture of General China (Waruhiu Itote), on 15 January 1954,65 presented an oppor-
tunity to revive the Green Branch surrender. This China scheme is better known than the
others, largely because the government failed to maintain secrecy at the time and its ulti-
mate failure was widely reported.66 The ﬁrst senior Mau Mau commander to fall into Brit-
ish hands, the wounded General China had his injuries treated before being interrogated
by Kikuyu-speaking Special Branch ofﬁcer Ian Henderson. This interrogation has become
one of the most controversial incidents of the Emergency, marking a signiﬁcant intelli-
gence break-through for the British, who were able to compile for the ﬁrst time a clear
and detailed understanding of the Mau Mau forest forces and their deployment, but being
viewed as an act of betrayal by many Mau Mau supporters who branded China as a trai-
tor.67 This accusation took on even greater potency in the weeks following the interro-
gation, when, after a suggestion from Henderson, China agreed to act as the intermediary
in negotiating a mass surrender of Mau Mau ﬁghters.68 From the beginning of this pro-
cess, Governor Baring hesitated, anxious about the possible adverse reaction from Kenya’s
settlers. He sought approval from London, warning that to pardon China would be likely
to raise an outcry from the settlers. But Churchill and the British Cabinet saw the China
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capture as opening the door to negotiation and possible surrenders, and urged Baring to
seize the initiative.69
Reportedly concerned by the high losses the rebel forces were suffering by early
1954,70 but almost certainly encouraged by the likelihood of escaping the hangman’s
noose through his cooperation, on 13 February China was taken to Nyeri, with Henderson,
and Operation Wedgwood – the name given the China surrender scheme – was
launched.71 At Nyeri, China composed 26 letters, each addressed to named Mau Mau lead-
ers, urging them to surrender. But amongst Kikuyu there was deep suspicion that China
was acting under duress. To thwart the rumours, Henderson paraded China around the
locations in which Mau Mau support was strongest, allowing him to walk around and talk
to local people. The move helped to build local conﬁdence in the surrender scheme, but it
infuriated many district administrators, who reported a devastatingly negative impact on
the morale of local Home Guard.72
The responses received in March to China’s letters were encouraging, and efforts were
made by Special Branch to set up meetings. As the negotiations moved ahead, rumours
swirled around Nairobi. Fearing further settler criticism, Baring panicked and on 4 March
made a public statement conﬁrming China’s role in surrender talks.73 Blundell, settler
leader and member of the four-man War Cabinet, had been deliberately excluded from
consultation on the surrenders, and now exploded in anger.74 So high were feelings run-
ning, that Erskine became concerned lest members of the district administration or the
security forces, especially Kenya Regiment staff working as District Ofﬁcers with Home
Guard units, might sabotage the operation. On 8 March, the Commander-in-Chief issued a
directive, reminding all staff that the intelligence gathered in the surrender operation had
already brought considerable gains and that the surrenders, if achieved, would bring a
quicker end to the conﬂict. But the most telling aspect of this intervention was that
Erskine felt the need to reassure African Loyalists that surrendered Mau Mau would not be
allowed to return to the Reserves, but would be put into detention.75 Erskine’s anxieties
affected the operational arrangements made to handle the surrenders, with explicit
instructions being given that no Home Guard units were to be involved in the surrenders
in any capacity, with soldiers initially handling rebels who gave themselves up.76
With the surrender proposals in place,77 on 9 March 1954, China, Henderson and
another Special Branch ofﬁcer met with two prominent representatives of the rebels deep
in the forest above Nyeri.78 A subsequent meeting was ﬁxed for Nyeri on 20 March, but
the rebels failed to attend.79 Another Mau Mau leader, General Kaleba, then voluntarily
came into Nyeri and asked to see China. This led to formal talks, held in the Provincial
Commissioner’s ofﬁce in Nyeri, attended by Kaleba, General Tanganyika, and ﬁve other
Mau Mau ﬁghters. Windley and Heyman represented the administration and army, respec-
tively, along with Gribble and Henderson from Special Branch. General China acted as the
intermediary. The discussion was conducted in Kikuyu, and Henderson translated.80 The
rebels were told that if they surrendered they would not be prosecuted for crimes, but
that they would be detained indeﬁnitely. After the meeting, Kaleba, Tanganyika, and their
comrades returned to the forest81 to consult with others.
Amongst the forest ﬁghters, the surrender offer was hotly debated, with Dedan Kimathi
strongly opposing the scheme, while other leaders were inclined to accept.82 With no con-
sensus, it was agreed to let individual ﬁghters do as they saw ﬁt. A mass surrender was
accordingly organized for 7 April 1954, and a rendezvous point agreed on the forest fringe
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at Konyu, in Nyeri. On the day before the planned surrender around 1000 rebels had
already gathered at Konyu, with another 600 reportedly on their way there under the
command of Kaleba. The next day, a section of the Mau Mau forces assembling for the sur-
render strayed across the forest boundary at Githuini, and were immediately attacked by a
King’s African Riﬂes (KAR) reconnaissance patrol. As gun-ﬁre sprayed the rebels, others in
the forest heard the commotion and ﬂed. The surrender scheme was wrecked. The com-
mander of the KAR patrol denied accusations that he had purposefully sabotaged the sur-
render, and Erskine never publicly criticized him, but the white settlers celebrated.83 On
the rebel side, Njama records that ‘China’s negotiations were Government lies and a great
attempt to capture the best leaders,’84 while even China himself conceded the ‘even the
Loyalist Home Guard was convinced that [he] had betrayed his own people.’85
As Operation Wedgwood came to an end, General China was returned to jail, now an
enemy of both the British and his former Mau Mau comrades.86 Capitalizing upon the
intelligence he had provided, between 11 and 15 April 1954, the Kikuyu Home Guard
rounded-up 1,200 members of Mau Mau’s Passive Wing, including oath administrators,
recruiters, treasurers, and food suppliers. All had been identiﬁed from General China’s
interrogation. Throughout the entire Emergency, only Operation Anvil, mounted against
the Mau Mau organization in Nairobi, would have a greater impact in destroying rebel
capacity,87 and at no other time would the loyalists enjoy such wholesale success against
their enemies.
Surrender offer 3: The double amnesty, January to June 1955
The third surrender offer, issued in January 1955, stemmed directly from the ‘militarization
of the countryside’ and the violent conduct of loyalist Home Guard units in Central Prov-
ince. Concerns about Home Guard violence had grown throughout 1953 and became
acute in the early part of 1954. In April 1954, only three months after Lyttleton had autho-
rized the further expansion of the Home Guard and an extension of their military duties in
civilian areas, Kenya’s Commissioner of Police, Arthur Young, set up a special investigation
unit within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to look into abuses by those in
government employment. Coming out to Kenya in September 1953, with experience
from Malaya, Young was a policeman who knew what a counter-insurgency campaign
looked like, and he was keenly aware of the need to protect the civil capacity of the police
from excessive militarization.88 Like Erskine, who had arrived three months earlier, he was
horriﬁed by what he found in Kenya. The rapid expansion of the police force to cope with
the Emergency had seen a lowering of standards and a dearth of training. The Kenya
Police had become alienated from local communities and were viewed as but one ele-
ment in a regime of surveillance and control, in which they worked alongside the Kikuyu
Home Guard. Brutality and excess had become norms in the daily practice of administra-
tion in the militarized countryside of central Kenya, and the worst offenders appeared to
be the Kikuyu militia and their European district ofﬁcers. Pointing out that the police
should be the guardians of the rule of law, what Young observed in the Kikuyu districts of
Kenya in 1954 he described as ‘the rule of fear.’89
Focusing initially only upon the district of Nyeri, the investigations initiated by Young
revealed some seventeen cases, from April to November 1954, in which there was evi-
dence of murders having been committed by Kikuyu Home Guard, their European district
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ofﬁcers also being directly implicated in nearly all these incidents. Young wanted the
cases to be fully investigated and prosecuted. The provincial administration in Central
Province wanted no such thing, arguing that any attempt to prosecute ‘loyal Kikuyu’
would lower morale and might fatally damage the ﬁght against Mau Mau in the country-
side. As the investigations got underway, the CID ofﬁcers found that the European staff of
the provincial and district administrations obstructed their enquiries, refusing to give
interviews, concealing or removing evidence, falsifying statements, and even colluding
with others to protect the accused.90 When two cases did ﬁnally come to court, the ﬁrst
the prosecution of prominent loyalist Chief Mundia for the shooting of an apparently
innocent man, the second the prosecution of a Kikuyu Home Guard Headman at Ruthaga-
thi for the murder of two local farmers who were falsely accused of Mau Mau afﬁliation, it
was apparent that European administrative ofﬁcers gave false evidence in order to pro-
vide the accused with fabricated alibis. While the accused man in the Ruthagathi trial
made a dramatic confession from the dock and was convicted, despite the perjury of Euro-
pean ofﬁcers in an effort to protect him,91 Chief Mundia was acquitted.92 However, the
determination of the police to pursue the case further was made clear in early December
1954, raising the possibility of a re-trial of Mundia and the subsequent prosecutions of the
ofﬁcials who had given false evidence in the ﬁrst trial. This was pushed hard by Young.
Outraged by the interference of the administration in his investigations, the Commissioner
of Police was now determined to bring a dozen more cases to court over the weeks
ahead.93
This was to prove the critical moment in the British counter-insurgency in Kenya. The
prosecutions had caused immense anxiety amongst the loyalist community, and there
were fears of mutiny by Home Guard units and widespread desertions.94 District and Pro-
vincial administrators, who had anyway opposed the prosecutions, now warned of dire
consequences as dissent mounted and loyalists threatened defection from the govern-
ment’s cause. Having come to rely upon the loyalist Home Guard, the British counter-
insurgency in Kenya could not now be sustained without their support.
Deeply alarmed by the situation, for once Governor Baring acted decisively, urged on
by an anxious Erskine. Over the next month Baring intervened directly to ﬁrst pardon the
loyalists convicted in the Ruthagathi case, allowing them to escape the gallows, and then
to announce a new surrender offer for Mau Mau forest ﬁghters that would be linked to an
amnesty from prosecution for those who laid down their arms. But the most critical deci-
sion was that the same amnesty would apply also to government employees who stood
charged of offences committed up to 18 January 1955, the date of the surrender offer.
This meant that nine murder cases in which arrests had already been made, would now
be dropped. These cases all involved Kikuyu chiefs, headmen and Home Guard. Another
20 cases which were under investigation, but in which arrests had not yet been made,
would also be closed as a result of the amnesty. All involved Kikuyu Home Guard. Seven-
teen of these were murder cases, European district ofﬁcers being implicated in three of
the enquiries.95
Erskine supported these steps. He had intended to launch a new surrender programme
in March 1955, but he now recognized the urgency of the situation provoked by the vio-
lence of the Home Guard. He emphasized the need to maintain Home Guard morale, and
avoid the risk of defections. The double amnesty seemed a reasonable solution for a difﬁ-
cult situation. Rebels would still face detention, but they would not be prosecuted for
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murder as had happened under previous surrender deals. The double amnesty ‘wiped the
slate clean,’ cancelling the plans Young had made for further prosecutions and effectively
allowing those Kikuyu Home Guard and the settler ofﬁcers of the Kenya Regiment who
stood accused of murder, torture, beatings and other abuses to escape without
punishment.96
Following the amnesty announcement, at the end of the month Baring also moved to
pardon Chief Mundia, on the grounds that his offence was now covered by the amnesty
and so he would no longer be required to stand for another trial. The European ofﬁcials
who had committed perjury in these trials were also exempted from further judicial
action.97 Despite their relief at the removal of the threat of prosecutions, loyalists worried
about what might happen if surrendered rebels returned to their homes? Kiambu’s District
Commissioner insisted that surrendered rebels be closely monitored by Special Branch,
‘since it is liable to have dangerous repercussions on the local populace who wonder why
such leading criminals are still at liberty,’ and others echoed the same concerns.98 In
Nanyuki, loyalists saw the double amnesty as ‘a weak act of expediency,’ and thought it
likely that, somehow, the government would trick them by allowing the surrendered ter-
rorists to return. These fears hardened loyalist resolve to resist the reintegration of the reb-
els back into their communities, a view expressed most trenchantly by loyalist Chief
Makimei at Lari.99
Where African loyalist reaction was relieved but guarded, the response of the white set-
tlers was intensely hostile. This came as a surprise to the government, Baring and Erskine
thinking that Blundell’s support for this surrender deal would carry the majority. Where
Blundell had sternly opposed the China negotiations, he now ‘unhesitatingly supported’
the double amnesty. As the settler representative on the War Council, he announced the
surrender and amnesty terms in the Kenya Legislative Council. The amnesty for the Kikuyu
Home Guard passed without signiﬁcant comment, but the news that surrendered Mau
Mau would not be prosecuted caused what Blundell would later describe as ‘a political
explosion of the greatest magnitude.’100 His actions in supporting the amnesty for rebels
was condemned as ‘cowardly and weak’: ‘We were accused of abandoning all moral prin-
ciples and undertaking parleys with murderers and rebels guilty of the unspeakable hor-
rors of the Mau Mau oaths and practices,’ he would later recall.101 Lawyer and Legislative
Council member for the Aberdares Constituency, Humphrey Slade, led these attacks, and
so savage were they that Blundell would never again recover his political position in the
white settler community.
The white settlers organized a campaign aimed at disrupting the surrender proposal,
and if possible having the decision reversed. Leaﬂets denouncing the surrenders, and
threatening any Mau Mau who tried to come forward, were privately printed and widely
distributed. It was asserted that settlers in the Kenya Regiment and in the Kenya Police
Reserve would do their utmost to disrupt the surrender plan. To combat this hostility, Ken-
ya’s Ofﬁce of Information mounted a huge propaganda campaign to promote the surren-
der offer, while also carefully monitoring settler opposition. In Nanyuki, settlers believed
that all cases against the security forces ‘should have been abandoned,’ while it was
widely assumed that the amnesty for terrorists had been imposed upon the Nairobi gov-
ernment by London and so might yet be overturned.102
Having attacked Blundell and rallied the opposition, leading settler politicians tried
every political trick they knew to overturn the double amnesty surrender offer. Exploiting
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his position as a minister and his seat in the Legislative Council, Havelock put a paper up
to the War Council requesting an urgent discussion of the terms of the surrender offer to
terrorists, though making no mention of the amnesty for security forces. He got his debate
on 15 February 1954, when he asked for the surrender campaign to be immediately termi-
nated.103 In reply, Erskine acknowledged that things were ‘pretty rocky’ and that relatively
few rebels had yet come in, but insisted that the surrender scheme needed a period of at
least three months if it was to work at all. He reassured the settlers that the surrender offer
was linked to a ﬁerce military campaign that would bring far greater pressure to bear
upon those still in the forests, and that it would be made plain to them that if they did not
surrender now then things would be made much worse in the future.104 To assuage settler
anger, and to nurture further support from the loyalists, the government offered to look
again at seizures of rebel property – and land forfeiture was indeed introduced in July, as
a measure against the families of those still in the forest when the surrender offer had
ended.105
Settlers also took the political ﬁght to the metropole. Feeding information to his power-
ful friends in London, Humphrey Slade hoped to embarrass Kenya’s beleaguered Gover-
nor Baring with questions to be asked in parliament, where Lord Milverton was primed.106
Under pressure to justify the actions of the Kenya administration, Crawford, Baring’s som-
brely bureaucratic deputy, composed a ten-page report for the Secretary of State on 5
February 1955. Somewhat implausibly, he defended the timing of the surrender offer as
being determined by military, and not political considerations. There was ‘evidence of a
desire to surrender among some of the gangs,’ he claimed, and because of the position of
military strength enjoyed by the British forces, there was no danger of the surrender offer
being viewed as a sign of ‘weakness.’ He continued with greater candour:
The information collected since 18 January has also conﬁrmed our fears that, because of crim-
inal investigations and the prosecution of certain loyalist leaders, the morale of the Kikuyu
Guard and the Chiefs was seriously falling at a time when it was indispensible to the success
of Operation Hammer [a military offensive] to be able to rely on the Kikuyu Guard to stop ter-
rorists bolting at the forest edge. The amnesty has undoubtedly restored loyalist morale. The
most important case pending against loyalists was the charge of murder against Chief Mun-
dia. He and his co-accused were acquitted on 31 January, but this would have been too late
for the restoration of loyalist morale.… Loyalist African opinion in the reserves was at ﬁrst
more concerned with the amnesty than with the surrender offer.107
Crawford next addressed the awkward question of the amnesty for government secu-
rity staff. Our decision ‘was not motivated by a wish to free responsible members of the
Security Forces, such as District Ofﬁcers, Police or Army from responsibility for alleged (but
much exaggerated) charges of misconduct,’ he asserted: but the government was not pre-
pared to see terrorists escape the lawful penalty for murder under the surrender offer,
‘while loyalists and supporters of the government, who had erred, continue to face the full
rigour of the law.’ Defending the Kikuyu Guard and chiefs who stood accused of murders,
Crawford noted ‘they faced almost intolerable danger and barbarities from their enemies.’
In fact, a state of civil war had developed in parts of the Kikuyu Reserve, he acknowledged,
‘and the rule of law is a harsh master when the writ of law has ceased to run.’108
The dissembling and deceit of this communication was indicated in other actions
already taken by Baring. While it was decided that any further offences committed after
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 61
the date of the amnesty must be subject to judicial action, the Kikuyu Home Guard had
clearly become too great a liability. At the end of December 1954, Baring issued a directive
on the disbandment of the Kikuyu Home Guard.109 This would occur gradually over 1955,
militia members who wished to continue in government service being offered transfers to
the Tribal Police, or to the ‘Watch-and-Ward’ groups that would take over the civilian
duties of the Home Guard.110 These new arrangements broke up the Home Guard, but as
Branch wryly notes, the same loyalists remained responsible for security throughout Cen-
tral Province by the end of 1955 as had been in charge in 1954.111 There would be little
change in behaviour, though the District Ofﬁcers of the Kenya Regiment would no longer
be directly implicated. The speed with which this decision was taken, following a frank
assessment of the true extent of Home Guard abuses in a grim meeting at Government
House on 23 December 1954,112 not only vindicated Young in his efforts to re-establish
the rule of law, but also indicates the manner in which Baring and Erskine were rapidly
cobbling together a political strategy that would lift them out of the crisis into which the
violence of the loyalist militia had plunged them.
This astonishing set of actions had immediate short-term political consequences. Police
Commissioner Young tendered his resignation in December, as soon as Baring made clear
his intention to pardon convicted loyalists.113 Attorney General John Whyatt, a supporter
of Young and a long-time advocate for the rule of law in Kenya’s increasingly dirty
counter-insurgency campaign, let it be known that he, too, would depart, accepting a
senior legal position in Malaya early in 1955.114 Further down the chain of command, the
CID ofﬁcers involved in the investigations against Home Guard and District Ofﬁcers also
departed, most notably the able, scholarly, but deeply disliked Donald MacPherson – who
had led the Nyeri enquiries.115 With these doves in ﬂight, the hawks, headed by the Pro-
vincial Commissioner of Central Province, C.M. Johnston, who had actively encouraged his
staff to disrupt Young’s enquiries and had himself refused to cooperate, now made haste
to reassure the Kikuyu Home Guard that their interests would be protected and their loy-
alty rewarded. The ‘rule of fear’ had trumped the rule of law, and the surrender offer was
the mechanism that had been used to enable this to happen.
As ever determined not to be distracted by the political fury raging around him, and
with the full backing of Lennox-Boyd, who had reassured the British Cabinet that the
double amnesty was ‘an imaginative move,’116 Erskine pushed ahead with the surrender
scheme. Bennett has provided a detailed account of the negotiations that were initiated
with Mau Mau forest ﬁghters from February onwards.117 Special Branch utilized a cap-
tured rebel, Major Chui, to set up talks. Chui was sent back into the forest on 10 Febru-
ary 1955,118 to make contact with Kimathi and Mathenge. Although there was great
suspicion amongst the rebels - who disbelieved that they would really be guaranteed
immunity from prosecution - talks were eventually arranged with a lower ranking group
of ﬁghters, including Kahinga. Under conditions of strict secrecy, a group of four rebels,
led by Kahinga, were brought to Nairobi on 17 March to meet with Windley and Hey-
man – the same ofﬁcials who had taken part in the negotiations in Operation Wedg-
wood. A second Nairobi meeting took place on 28 March, at which it became clear that
progress could not be made unless the rebels based in the Aberdare forest were able to
meet with those on Mt Kenya. To facilitate this, Erskine agreed to a temporary halt to
military operations over a period of ten days in the area between the two rebel strong-
holds. Squabbling between Kimathi, Mathenge, Kahinga and other Mau Mau leaders
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now disrupted things, but the rebels in the Aberdares then asked for a meeting in the
forest with African politicians. On 16 April 1955, Legislative Council member Eliud Mathu
and two other African political leaders entered the forest, but little progress was made
in their talks.
These protracted discussions had to be conducted in secrecy for fear of the reaction of
settler politicians, but there were inevitably rumours in Nairobi that the government was
preparing to make a ‘settlement’ with the terrorists. At this point, on 2 May 1955, Lathbury
arrived in Nairobi to replace Erskine.119 At ﬁrst reluctant to ditch the surrender plans which
were in full ﬂow, Lathbury put his support behind the scheme, but he was clearly less con-
vinced of the importance of the initiative than had been his predecessor. Just two days
after his arrival, a further delegation of 11 Mau Mau, led by Kahiu Itina, believed by Special
Branch to be fourth in the rebel hierarchy, reached Nairobi.120 This meeting appeared to
make real progress, and a token surrender of the ﬁrst 50 rebels was arranged, prior to a
mass surrender. But in the next week a further rebel delegation turned up, bearing a letter
they said was from Mathenge that rejected all plans for surrenders until the Emergency
was brought to an end.
By now, Lathbury was exasperated: ‘I considered this token surrender as an essential
demonstration of good faith on the part of the terrorists and I was not prepared to allow
too much latitude in its execution.’121 Under Lathbury’s direction, the War Council
demanded that the surrenders take place by 18 May. Heyman then attended a further
meeting in the forest on 17 May, at which Mathenge’s representatives adopted a more
conciliatory tone and the deadline was extended to 20 May. But when no surrenders took
place on that day, Lathbury ﬁnally broke off the negotiations and Operation Gimlet began
almost immediately.122 Gimlet, initially planned by Erskine, was intended to hit hard at
the rebels remaining in the Aberdares, splitting the gangs. It would mark the beginning of
the end for the rebels remaining in the forests.123
The end of the double amnesty surrender offer was declared on 10 July, when the
terms of the initial Green Branch surrender were reinstated.124 Two million surrender leaf-
lets were distributed in Central Province and dropped over the forests warning that those
who did not take up the amnesty offer would face losing their land.125 Over the next few
months, more rebels gave themselves up, until by the end of the forest war in December
1956 there had been 2,714 rebel surrenders in all, 979 of them during the third surrender
offer between January and May 1955.126 After the double amnesty, the end of the military
conﬂict came swiftly. The military handed over Embu and Meru to the civilian authorities
in June, and Kiambu, Nairobi, South Nyeri, Laikipia and Naivasha followed in July. By the
time that Nanyuki returned to civil administration in August, Britain’s military commitment
in Kenya was being wound-down, and the loyalists had ﬁrmly established their hegemony
over all the Kikuyu areas of Central Province.127
Conclusion: impunity and the state
The double amnesty of January 1955 achieved what was intended: it swept aside the pros-
ecutions of loyalists and brought an amnesty for the security forces that thwarted deser-
tion and disaffection. Lathbury then swiftly asserted his military strategy. July 1955 saw
Operation Dante in the Aberdares, and Operation Beatrice on Mt Kenya. This would break
the back of the last remnants of Mau Mau’s ﬁghting force, leaving the way open for the
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ﬁnal phase in which small, specialized operational groups, the pseudo-gangs, mopped up
the remaining rebel forces.128
Four key points can be drawn from the loyalist bargain made by the British in Kenya in
1955. First, as Bennett has shown, in military terms the surrender deals offered to Kenya’s
rebels were a success. It can be estimated that approximately 10 to 12 per cent of those
ﬁghters who went to the forests ultimately surrendered,129 and both Erskine and Lathbury
acknowledge the importance of surrenders in undermining Mau Mau solidarity and open-
ing the way to their ﬁnal defeat.130 This undoubtedly helped to win the war. But this suc-
cess would not have been possible without the amnesty offered to the security forces in
January 1955, and especially the impunity this gave to loyalist Kikuyu militiamen. The
maintenance of this alliance was the crucial factor in British success in the counter-insur-
gency, a fact recognized at the time by Baring and Erskine in the speed with which they
moved in December 1954 to take the necessary steps that would prevent loyalist defec-
tions. In doing so, the political actions implemented by the British rode roughshod over
the rule of law, giving impunity to criminal racketeers, torturers, and murderers.
Second, it must be realized that loyalist fears were about more than prosecutions.
The British secured loyalist commitment to their cause by exiling rebels from their com-
munities – more than 70,000 Kikuyu were removed to detention camps on suspicion of
Mau Mau sympathies131 - and giving guarantees that those deﬁned as ‘hard-core’ would
never return. The terms offered to surrendered forest ﬁghters alerted loyalists to the real-
ity that this promise would inevitably be broken. While only a small minority worried
about facing criminal charges, the vast majority were deeply anxious at the prospect of
their enemies being return into their midst. After 1955, as the British began to release
‘hard core’ detainees from the camps, this anxiety deepened amid a growing clamour for
institutional protections against the claims that the returning exiles might make. Right up
to the eve of independence, the British worried that this confrontation of loyalist and
rebel might spill over into a fresh outburst of armed violence in Central Province.132
Thirdly, British commitment to their loyalist allies was such that they could not conceive
of how to govern Kenya without them. Despite the noise made by European settlers over
the precipitous British decision to ‘scuttle and run’ from Kenya after 1959, it was the
Kikuyu loyalists, and not the white highlanders, whose interests the departing colonialists
would work hard to secure: white settlers were expendable, Kikuyu loyalist allies were
not.133 When the ﬁghting war came to an end, loyalist leaders were therefore consoli-
dated as a ruling elite in Central Province, given control of administrative positions as local
government was restored from 1956, and then shepherded into government as Kenya’s
decolonization got underway from 1959. Their monopoly of local politics was secured by
laws that prevented known rebels from participating in elections, and once in positions of
authority they were able to exclude former Mau Mau from many areas of public life, while
also blocking any attempt they made to restore their lost property or to recover their for-
feited land.134 Kikuyu loyalists were the building blocks with which Kenya’s post-colonial
state was constructed in Central Province, and in the 1960s they even came to dominate
the political economy of the entire country.135
Fourthly, amnesty, and the impunity it invoked, would reverberate through the political
life of independent Kenya under the government of Jomo Kenyatta. Mau Mau remained
banned until 2003. Public silence about Mau Mau was a means to avoid discussion of the
unﬁnished business of the Emergency, and a way to prevent claims being made against
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loyalists. The loyalist bargain therefore consolidated the authority of the independent
Kenyan state, ﬁrst shaping the settlement that was made in the process of decolonization,
and then securing the position of the political elite who governed the country. And impu-
nity was not an idea conﬁned to colonial Kenya. In 1970, Kenyatta’s loyalist Attorney Gen-
eral, Charles Njonjo, would pass into law the Indemnity Act, to ‘protect the activities of
government ofﬁcials and security ofﬁcers.’ This was speciﬁcally aimed at thwarting the
prosecution of soldiers and police for acts of atrocity committed in northern Kenya,
between 1962 and 1967, during the Shifta War against Somali insurgents.136 Until its
annulment in 2010, this act came to represent ‘the institutionalisation of impunity in
Kenya.’137
We began by asking what future loyalist militias might have - as allies of empire and
collaborators of the colonial state - after colonialism? In the Kenyan case, the answer is
that they inherited political power and took over the state for themselves. Kenya’s loyalist
story is therefore highly unusual: Kikuyu loyalists won both the counter-insurgency war,
and they won the peace that decolonization brought. Ultimately, the loyalist bargain of
1955 made the state that Kenya has become.
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